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[41 C.2d

IN RE DIXON

Ill. 468, 474 [104 N.E. 829]; Tharp v. Massengill, 38 N.M.
58, 62 [28 P.2d 502, 94 A.L.R. 726] ; see Union Nat. Bank v.
Crump, 349 Pa. 339, 343 [37 A.2d 733] .) It is my opinion
that when, as here, the offer is bona fide and is for the identical
property, and is by a purchaser able and willing to buy, evidence of the offer should be admitted. Accordingly, the trial
judge ruled correctly that the witness could mention the offer
for his property in giving the reasons for his valuation. (See
Long Beach City H.S. Dist. v. Stewart, 30 Cal.2d 763, 773
[185 P.2d 585, 173 A.L.R. 249] .)
Carter, .T., and Schauer, concurred.

[Crim. No. 5171.

In Bank.

Dec. 15, 1953.]

In re CHARLES AUGUSTUS DIXON, on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Habeas Corpus- Writ as Substitute for Appeal.-Habeas
corpus cannot ordinarily serve as a substitute" for appeal and,
in absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for
failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where
claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised on timely
appeal from a judgment of conviction.
[2] !d.-Writ as Substitute for Appeal_:Excuses for Failure to
AppeaL-Failure of petitioner seeking writ of habeas corpus to
resort to remedy of appeal cannot be excused on basis of explanation that he lost right to appeal because of his ignorance
of the law, where he was represented by counsel during all
stages of trial from arraignment through pronouncement of
judgment and sentence, and where there is no showing that he
did not have, or could not obtain, aid of counsel during time
within which he could have taken an appeal.
[3] !d.-Petition: Burden of Proof.-Petitioner in habeas corpus
proceeding has burden of alleging and proving all facts on
which he relies to overturn judgment of conviction and of
[1] See Cal.Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 4; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus,
§§ 22, 28.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 5, 7] Habeas Corpus, § 12; [3]
Habeas Corpus,§§ 51, 60; [4] Habeas Corpus,§ 52; [6, 12J Habeas
Corpus, § 27; [8] Arrest, § 6; [9, 10] Searches and Seizures, § 1;
[11] Criminal Law, § 471; [13] Habeas Corpus, §§ 26, 30; [14]
Habeas Corpus,§ 15; [15] Criminal Law,§ 119; [16, 17] Counterfeiting, § 1.
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giving a satisfactory reason for not resorting to his remedy of
appeal.
[4] !d.-Petition-Essential Allegations.-In absence of allegations in petition for habeas corpus that petitioner did not
refuse services of counsel, he is in no position to assert that
he was ignorant of the law as excuse for not resorting to his
remedy of appeal.
[5] !d.-Writ as Substitute for Appeal-Excuses for Failure to
AppeaL-Allegation in petition for writ of habeas corpus as
to lack of funds for a transcript raises a false issue and is
immaterial, since petitioner would have been entitled to a
transcript of evidence at expense of the state.
[6] Id.-Grounds-Evidence.-Habeas corpus may not be used
instead of appeal to review determinations of fact made on
conflicting evidence after a fair trial.
[7] !d.-Grounds-Errors and Irregularities.-A writ of habeas
corpus is not available to correct errors or irregularities
relating to ascertainment of facts when such errors could and
should have been raised by appeal, even though alleged errors
involving factual issues relate to an asserted denial of constitutional rights.
[8] Arrest-Criminal Cases-Without Warrant.-Where it appears that police officers went to petitioner's apartment while
looking for another man, identified themselves as officers, were
invited by appellant to enter apartment, and one of them,
standing in an inner doorway and looking into another room,
observed some of equipment assertedly used by petitioner for
counterfeiting, they could arrest him without a warrant, they
having reasonable cause for believing that he had committed
a felony. (Pen. Code, § 836.)
[9] Searches and Seizures-As Incident to Lawful Arrest.-Where
police officers lawfully entered petitioner's apartment on his invitation, it was proper for them, as an incident to lawful arrest,
to search premises and seize articles which they believed were
being used by him in commission of crime for which he was
arrested.
[10] !d.-Propriety of Seizure.-Action of federal agents in taking possession of additional evidence discovered in petitioner's
apartment after their arrival, pursuant to request of police
officers making arrest, was proper in view of showing that
such evidence was willingly disclosed to them by petitioner.
[11] Criminal Law- Evidence- Confessions- Voluntary Character.-Voluntary character of petitioner's confession follow[5] See Cal.Jur., Appeal and Error, § 438.
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 7 et seq.; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 22
et seq.
·
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ing his arrest is sufficiently shown by testimony that it was
freely given and that no force was used on him except for a
slight scuffle when he vms handcuffed.
[12] Habeas Corpus-Grounds-Evidence.-Petitioner is not entitled in a habeas corpus proceeding to a consideration of
claims which are based on his version of conflicting evidence
and which could have been, but were not, raised on appeal.
[13] Id.- Grounds- Evidence: TriaL-Petitioner's contentions
that irrelevant evidence was erroneously admitted at his trial
and that the prosecution was guilty of misconduct could have
been dealt with on a timely appeal from judgment of conviction, and such matters are not reviewable in a habeas corpus
proceeding.
[14] !d.-Grounds-Constitutionality of Statute.-The constitutionality of a statute comes within an exception to general
rule requiring resort to appeal as a prerequisite to remedy of
habeas corpus.
[15] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Acts Violative of State
and Federal Laws.-A state is not precluded from acting
with respect to a particular subject merely because power
over that subject has been expressly granted to Congress by
the Constitution; the same act may be made a crime by both
state and federal governments.
[16] Counterfeiting-Validity of State Legislation.-In absence
of federal legislation which occupies the field, state legislatures
have authority to prohibit counterfeiting of federal money.
[17] !d.-Validity of State Legislation.-Whether Congress has
occupied a particular field depends on whether it intended to exclude state legislation, and U. S. Code, title 18,
which relates to federal crimes in addition to counterfeiting,
and which declares that nothing therein shall be held to take
away or impair jurisdiction of courts of several states under
laws thereof, reserves jurisdiction of the states to punish
counterfeiting.

PROCEEDING m habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ denied.
Franklin C. Stark, under appointment by Supreme Court,
for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Clarence A.
Linn, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
GIBSON, C. J.-After a trial before a jury in the superior
court petitioner was convicted of a violation of section 480
of the Penal Code, which prohibits the making or possessing
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of dies, plates or other apparatus used in counterfeiting.*
He was sentenced to San Quentin, where he is now imprisoned.
No appeal was taken from the judgment of conviction.
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus and contends, in
part, that real evidence used to convict him was obtained by
unlawful search and seizure and that his confession, which
was received in evidence, was obtained by coercion. In support of his contentions petitioner makes allegations to the
effect that police officers and federal secret service agents
illegally searched his home and seized evidence used against
him, that he was beaten and threatened, and that his confession was not made voluntarily. These allegations are controverted by the return, which alleges that all the matters complained of by petitioner were urged and considered at his
trial in the superior court.
In view of the fact that petitioner did not appeal we must
determine whether any of the matters urged by him may
nevertheless be appropriately considered in this proceeding.
[1] The general rule is that habeas corpus cannot serve as
a substitute for an appeal, and, in the absence of special
circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to employ
that remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed errors
could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal
from a judgment of conviction. (In re Mcinturff, 37 Cal.2d
876, 880 [236 P.2d 574] ; In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701, 705
[108 P.2d 10]; see In re James, 38 Cal.2d 302, 309 [240 P.2d
596]; In re Manchester, 33 Cal.2d 740, 742 [204 P.2d 881];
In re Byrnes, 26 Cal.2d 824, 827 [161 P.2d 376]; cf. Brown
v. AUen, 344 U.S. 443 [73 S.Ct. 397, 420-422, 97 L.Ed. 469] .)
'l'he only explanation given by petitioner for his failure to
appeal is that he lost the right because of his ignorance of
the law and because of a lack of funds necessary to order a
transcript of the record.
[2] Petitioner's failure to appeal cannot be excused upon
the basis of his explanation. He was represented by counsel
during all stages of his trial from arraignment through pro*Section 480 of the Penal Code provides: ''Every person who makes,
or knowingly has in his possession any die, plate, or any apparatus,
paper, metal, machine, or other thing whatever, made use of in counterfeiting coin current in this state, or in counterfeiting gold-dnRt, gold or
silver bars, bullion, lumps, pieces, or nuggets, or in counterfeiting bank
notes or bills, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less
than one nor more than fourteen years; and all such dies, plates, apparatus, paper, metal, or machine, intended for the purpose aforesaid,
must be destroyed.''
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nouncement of judgment and sentence, and there is no showing that he did not have, or could not obtain, the aid of counsel
during the time within which he could have taken an appeal.
, Although the application for habeas corpus was apparently
prepared by petitioner without the aid of an attorney, he is
now represented by counsel, who argued on his behalf at the
hearing before this court. No claim has been made, however,
that his failure to appeal was due to lack of opportunity to
consult an attorney or that he was in any manner deprived of
the right to the assistance of an attorney during the time
within which he could have appealed from the conviction.
[3] Petitioner has the burden in this proceeding of alleging
and proving all facts upon which he relies to overturn the
judgment and of giving a satisfactory reason for not resorting
to his remedy of appeal. (See In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304
[209 P.2d 793]; In 1·e Manchester, 33 Cal.2d 740, 742 [204
P.2d 881] ; In 1·e Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701, 711 [108 P.2d 10] .)
[4] For all that appears petitioner may have refused the
services of counsel, and, in the absence of allegations to the
. contrary, he is in no position to assert that he was ignorant
~f the law.
[5] His allegation as to lack of funds for a
transcript raises a false issue and is entirely immaterial, since
he would have been entitled to a transcript of the evidence at
the expense of the state. (People v. Smith, 34 Cal.2d 449 [211
P.2d 561]; see 4 Cal.Jur.2d 262.)
We must consider whether, regardless of the lack of a satisfactory excuse for the failure to appeal, we may properly pass
upon petitioner's claims relating to forced confession and
unlawful search and seizure. Petitioner argues that a failure
to appeal will not prevent a resort to habeas corpus when, as
here, fundamental constitutional rights are involved. His
contentions, however, depend entirely on his version of what
occurred, and, as we shall see, there was ample evidence from
which the trial court could have found that there was no
violation of his rights. [6] It is, of course, an established
rule that habeas corpus may not be used instead of an appeal
\ to review determinations of fact made upon conflicting evidence after a fair trial. (In re Horowitz, 33 Cal.2d 534, 546
\(203 P.2d 513]; In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 [177 P.2d
918].) . [7] Likewise, the writ is not available to correct
errors or irregularities relating to ascertainment of the facts
when such errors could and should have been raised by appeal.
(Of. In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 722 [177 P.2d 918]; In re
Porterfield, 28 Cal.2d 91, 99 [168 P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675] .)

,
1
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'l'he same principles should apply even though the alleged'
errors involving factual issues relate to an asserted denial of
constitutional rights. ( Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 [73
S.Ot. 397, 421-422, 97 L.Ed. 469] .) It would obviously be
improper to permit a collateral attack because of claimed
errors in the determination of the facts after expiration of the
time for appeal when evidence may have disappeared and witnesses may have become unavailable.
The clerk's and reporter's transcripts of the proceedings in
the trial court have been made a part of the record herein, and
we have examined them to ascertain whether the facts relating
to petitioner's contentions were before that court and whether
any error in connection therewith could have been raised on
appeal. The record shows that the issues relating to the
confession and the claimed unlawful search and seizure were
argued during the trial, that the testimony on these matters
was conflicting, and that the evidence would have supported
a finding that there was no violation of petitioner's constitutional rights. According to the testimony and the inferences
to be drawn therefrom, two police officers, who were looking
for a Mr. Levitt, went to petitioner's apartment and rang
the bell. They identified themselves as police officers when
petitioner came to the door, and he invited them to enter.
While one of them was talking to him, the other, standing in
an inner doorway and looking into another room, observed
some of the equipment assertedly used by petitioner for counterfeiting, including a ten dollar bill taped to a printing frame
before a camera. The officers then arrested and handcuffed
petitioner, the premises were searched and certain articles
were seized. The police officers telephoned United States
secret service agents, and additional evidence was discovered
after the federal agents arrived, but the record shows that such
evidence was voluntarily disclosed to the agents by petitioner
in response to their questions. The officers and agents denied
that petitioner was beaten or threatened, and there was testimony that his confession was given freely and voluntarily
and that no force was used upon him except for a slight scuffle
when he was handcuffed.
[8] It could be concluded from the evidence that the
police officers lawfully entered the apartment and that they
thereafter had reasonable cause for believing that petitioner
had committed a felony. Hence they could arrest him without
a warrant. (Pen. Code, § 836.) [9] Thereafter it was
proper for them, as an incident to a lawful arrest, to search
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the premises and seize articles which they believed were being
used by petitioner in the commission of the crime for which
he was arrested. (Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151
et seq. [67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399] ; see 79 C.J.S. 795-796.)
[10] Similarly, the action of the federal agents in taking
possession of the additional evidence discovered after their
arrival was proper in view of the showing that such evidence
was willingly disclosed to them by petitioner. [11] With
regard to his confession, the testimony as to its voluntary
character is clearly sufficient.
It is thus apparent from the record as a whole that the
matters of which petitioner complains were before the trial
court and that there was evidence which would have supported findings that there was no violation of his constitutional rights in connection with his confession or the search
and seizure. [12] Although difficult questions of law might
be presented if the facts alleged by petitioner with respect
to these matters were accepted, he is not entitled in this proceeding to a consideration of claims which are based upon his
version of the conflicting evidence and which could have been,
but were not, raised on appeal. [13] Likewise, petitioner's
contentions that irrelevant evidence was erroneously admitted
at his trial and that the prosecution was guilty of misconduct
clearly could have been dealt with upon a timely appeal
from the judgment of conviction, and such matters are not
reviewable in this proceeding. (In re Manchester, 33 Cal.2d
740, 743-744 [204 P.2d 881]; In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709,
723-724 [177 P.2d 918].)
[14] Finally, petitioner contends that section 480 of the
Penal Code, under which he was convicted, is unconstitutional.
This contention comes within a recognized exception to the
general rule requiring resort to appeal as a prerequisite to
the remedy of habeas corpus. The decisions involving this
writ have uniformly passed upon the constitutionality of
legislation and, in most instances, have done so as a matter
of course without discussion of the propriety of the writ or
the availability of an appeal. (See In re Wells, 35 Cal.2d
889, 892-895 [221 P.2d 947] [considering merits of contentions although noting that they could have been, but were
not, presented on appeal] ; In re Porterfield, 28 Cal.2d 91, 99
[168 P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675] ; In re Herrera, 23 Cal.2d
206, 208, 214 [143 P.2d 345] [no discussion] ; In re Bell, 19
Cal.2d 488, 492-495 [122 P.2d 22] ; In re Sidebotham, 12 Cal.
2d 434 [85 P.2d 453, 122 A.L.R. 496] [no discussion] ; 13
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Cal.Jur. 225-226; cf. In re Leach, 215 Cal. 536, 543-545, 547
[12 P.2d 3] [stating that it is well settled that constitutionality
of a law may be raised on habeas corpus] . )
Petitioner asserts that section 480 is void because, he argues,
the United States Constitution gives Congress the sole power
to punish the counterfeiting of federal currency. Section 8
of article I of the United States Constitution provides that
"the Congress shall have power . . . . To coin money, regulate
the value thereof, and of foreign coin. . . . To provide for
the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and gold coin
of the United States." [15] A state, of course, is not precluded from acting with respect to a particular subject merely
because power over that subject has been expressly granted
to Congress by the Constitution, and it has been recognized
that the same act may be made a crime by both state and federal governments. (California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 731
[69 S.Ct. 841, 93 L.Ed. 1005] [regulation of interstate commerce]; United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 381-384 [43
S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed. 314] [sale of intoxicating liquor]; People
v. Grosofsky, 73 Cal.App.2d 15, 17 [165 P.2d 757] ; see 15
Am.Jur. 68.) [16] Although the cases are not entirely
clear, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that,
in the absence of federal legislation which occupies the field,
state legislatures have authority to prohibit counterfeiting of
federal money. (See Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 319, 322323 [23 S.Ct. 543, 47 L.Ed. 833]; United States v. Arjona,
120 U.S. 479, 487 [7 S.Ct. 628, 30 L.Ed. 728]; cf. Fox v. State
of Ohio, 5 How. (46 U.S.) 410,432 et seq. [12 L.Ed. 213].)
In California the case of People v. White, 34 Cal. 183, 186,
sustained a conviction under a statute similar to section 480
of the Penal Code for knowingly procuring and possessing
instruments used in counterfeiting United States gold coin.
The court rejected an argument that the statute was contrary
to the federal Constitution, stating· that the United States
Supreme Court had decided the matter adversely to the views
advanced by the defendant's counsel. (See, also, People v.
McDonnell, 80 Cal. 285 [22 P. 190, 13 Am.St.Rep. 159].)
Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion on the
ground that the states have concurrent power with the federal
government unless Congress provides for exclusive federal
control. (Commonwealth v. Fuller, 8 Met. (Mass.) 313, 314
et seq. [41 Am.Dec. 509] ; Harlan v. People, 1 Doug. (Mich.)
207, 209-212; Straube v. State, 40 Tex.Crim.Rep. 581 [51
S.W. 357, 358] ; Martiny. State, 18 Tex.App. 224, 225.)
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[17] There is no merit to petitioner's contention that
the field was occupied by the enactment of chapter 25 of
Title 18 of the United States Code which provides for the
punishment of counterfeiting and related crimes. Whether
Congress has occupied a particular field depends upon
whether it intended to exclude state legislation. (California
v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728-733 [69 S.Ct. 841, 93 L.Ed. 1003] .)
Title 18, which relates to other federal crimes in addition
to counterfeiting, expressly provides that "Nothing in this
title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction
of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof."
(U.S.C.A. § 3231.) Substantially identical provisions in
former federal statutes have been held to expressly reserve
the jurisdiction of the states to punish counterfeiting. (Ex
parte Geisler, 50 F. 411; People v. White, 34 Cal. 183, 186;
Iowa v. Mc:Pherson, 9 Iowa 53, 55; People v. Fury, 279
N.Y. 433 [18 N.E.2d 650, 651] ; Strou'be v. State, 40 Tex.
Crim.Rep. 581 [51 S.W. 357, 358]; see Sexton v. California,
189 U.S. 319, 322 [23 S.Ct. 543, 47 L.Ed. 833] ; Nastasi v.
Aderhold, 201 Ga. 237 [39 S.E.2d 403, 405] .)
The order to show cause is discharged, and the writ is
denied.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
There can be no question but that the record discloses a
flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional rights. The
majority opinion conveys the false impression that the
officers went to petitioner's home looking for a Mr. Levitt
and accidentally saw the counterfeiting material and equipment. It is there stated that petitioner invited the officers
in and that the entry of the police officers was peaceful. This
is refuted by the statement in respondent's brief that ''In the
instant case the officers had reason to believe that one Levitt
had committed a felony and was in the premises. They had a
right to break and enter in an endeavor to apprehend Levitt."
(Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion fails to give the complete factual
background of this case. It fails to mention that at the
instigation of the federal officers who made the search, petitioner was charged by a federal grand jury with the same
crime as is here involved. Upon the trial, in the federal dis-
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trict court, he moved to suppress the evidence which had been
seized in violation of his constitutional rights; that motion
was granted by Judge Dal M. Lemmon and it was ordered
that "The evidence other than the written statement, the
photographs taken by the officers and the written consent"
be delivered to the defendant. The evidence so ordered to
be delivered to petitioner was not delivered to him but to
police officers of the city and county of San Francisco who
used it to institute the criminal action in which he was convicted. This petition for a writ of habeas corpus stems from
the judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court of
the City and County of San Francisco. The charge against
petitioner in the federal court was dismissed.
As Judge Lemmon pointed out in his opinion, that any
invitation by defendant to the officers was in submission to
authority rather than an intelligent and voluntary waiver of
his right of protection from illegal arrest or unreasonable
search and seizure. (Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
[68 S.Ct. 367, 96 L.Ed. 436] .) It is admitted by the prosecution that there was a .scuffie when petitioner was handcuffed
after asking if the officers had a search warrant. Petitioner's
so-called voluntary oral consent to a search was given while
he was handcuffed; his written consent to such a search was
also given while he was handcuffed. For all practical purposes, aside from any force used by the officers, the entry by
the officers and their search of petitioner's home was illegal
and in violation of his constitutional rights. As ,Judge
Lemmon stated, there was present coercion, both physical
and psychological. Petitioner knew that incriminating evidence had been found; he was handcuffed when his consent
to a thorough seareh was refused and later gave his consent. A consent given under such circumstances is not the
consent which the law requires before a lawful search may
be made. A forced consent is no consent at all. (United
States v. Baldocci, 42 F .2d 567.)
In California, due to an unfortunate line of decisions,
evidence illegally obtained is admissible in the courts. With
these holding I have always been in disagreement. (See
dissenting opinion in People v. Rochin, 101 Oal.App.2d 140,
143 [225 P.2d 1, 913]; reversed by United States Supreme
Court, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96
L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396] .) I have always taken the
position that the decisions of this court have given aid
and comfort to so-called officers of the law who are so lacking
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in respect for the constitutional provisions here involved that
they ruthlessly violate them with impunity. To them the constitutional right of privacy does not exist, and they make an
empty, hollow mockery out of the oath which they took to
support the Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides that ''The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . ... " (Emphasis added.) The same provision is found in the California Constitution, article I, section 19. The federal courts
have refused to allow this right to be violated. I wish I
could say the same thing for the courts of California. We
are told by a majority of this court that the action of the
federal agents in taking possession of additional evidence
discovered after their arrival was proper in, view of the
showing that such evidence was willingly disclosed to them
by petitioner. This is in conflict with the decision of Judge
Lemmon who held' that the evidence was illegally obtained
and ordered it returned to defendant. His decision on this
issue is final and should be res adjudicata. It is ignored
by the majority. The evidence is uncontradicted-in fact
it is admitted-that at the time the search was made petitioner
was handcuffed. It would appear to me that one who is handcuffed is not in a position to do anything willingly. We are
also told that evidence was voluntarily disclosed by petitioner. This so-called voluntary disclosure was also made
after he was handcuffed. In view of the foregoing it is
perfectly obvious that the search and seizure were unlawful.
As Mr. Justice Douglas said in McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153] : "We are not
dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the
Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals
nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities.
It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need
to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right
of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the
arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history
shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.
And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the
desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the
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home. We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement
and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing
by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative." (Emphasis added.)
In this record I find no evidence that such an emergency
existed as to excuse the procurement of a search warrant
and Judge Lemmon so held. It is also my opinion that, under
the fact presented here, to hold that petitioner "willingly"
and "voluntarily" permitted the officers to search and seize
evidence found in his home is a travesty upon the accepted
meaning of those words.
The majority here disregards the mandate of both the
federal and state Constitutions that the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects shall
not be violated, and sanctions the violation of these mandates
on the ground of expediency.
It is indeed regrettable that the majority of this court
has again seen fit to perpetuate a rule which permits peace
officers to flout these constitutional mandates. This rule
was first pronounced by this court in People v. Mayen, 188
Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383], which was followed
by the cases of People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal.2d 165 [124 P.2d
44], and People v. Kelley, 22 Cal.2d ] 69 [137 P.2d 1].
Abuses which have been practiced under this rule have been
declared by the Supreme Court of the United States to be of
such gravity and so inhuman as to shock the conscience of
mankind and that ''this course of proceeding by agents of
government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.'' (See Rockin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396] .) While
the reversal of this court by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Rochin case was not based upon the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States but upon
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to that Constitution, it cannot be denied that had the
courts of California followed the federal rule with respect
to excluding evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful
search and seizure, the Rochin case would never have occurred
and this court would have escaped the censure implicit in
the following statement in the Rochin case at page 174:
"In deciding this case we do not heedlessly bring into question decisions in many States dealing with essentially different, even if related, problems. We therefore put to one
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side cases which have arisen in the State courts through use
of modern methods and devices for discovering wrongdoers
and bringing them to book. It does not fairly represent
these decisions to suggest that they legalize force so brutal
and so offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from
a suspect as is revealed by this record. Indeed the California
Supreme Court has not sanctioned this mode of securing a
conviction. It merely exercised its discretion to decline a
review of the conviction. All the California judges who have
expressed themselves in this case have condemned the conduct in the strongest language." It should be noted that the
statement in the above excerpt that "the California Supreme
Court has not sanctioned this mode of securing a conviction,"
is not a correct statement, as the Rochin case was before this
court on a petition for hearing after decision by the District
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, and that petition
was denied by the vote of every member of this court except
Justice Schauer and myself who wrote dissenting opinions to
the order of denial. (See People v. Rochin, 101 Cal.App.2d
140, 143, 149 [225 P.2d 1, 913] .)
It cannot be denied that it lies within the power of a
majority of this court to change the rule which permitted and
encouraged the shocking and inhuman conduct of peace officers depicted in the Rochin case and in the case at bar.
The courts of last resort of many other states have seen fit to
adopt and follow the federal rule relating to the admissibility
of evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search and
seizure.
On December 6, 1950, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in
the case of Rickards v. State, overruled two prior decisions
of that court and adopted the federal rule with respect to the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful
search and seizure; that is, search without a search warrant.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware is reported
in 6 Terr. (Del.) 573 [77 A.2d 199]. In the course of its
opinion in this case, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated:
"It would serve little purpose to catalog numerous decisions
of State and Federal Courts discussing the rule. There is a
direct conflict between the respective points of view; they are
irreconcilable.
''Courts admitting such evidence, while recognizing the
existence of the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
search and seizure and compulsory self-incrimination, nevertheless, hold that the protection of those guarantees does not
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require evidence obtained in violation of them to be excluded.
In answer to the argument that the guarantees have been
violated by state officials, it is said that the state, itself, has
committed no violation because it adopts as its acts only the
legal acts of its officials, and that officials who illegally violate
constitutional guarantees do so on their own initiative and
not under the sponsorship of or for the benefit of the state.
'fhe remedy of the individual whose rights have been violated
is stated to be a civil action against the official who has invaded
his constitutional rights.
"Courts following the Federal rule adopt the view that
the efficient prosec,ution of criminals cannot justify a deliberate
invasion of the right of the C'itizen to be made secure against
the violation of specific constitutional guarantees, and that the
suggested remedy of a civil action is as a practical matter no
remedy at all. The Federal rule is a practical attempt to
help preserve the constitutional gtuarantees.
"We prefer the rule followed in the Federal courts. We
conceive it the dtdy of the courts to protec.t constit?dional
guarantees. The most effective way to protect the guarantees
against tmreasonable sea1·ch and sei.zttre and compulsory selfincrimination is to exclude f1·om evidence any matter obtained
by a violation of them.
"We believe that as long as the Constitution of this state
contains the gtwrantees to the citizen refetYed to, we have
no choice but to use every means at our disposal to preserve
those gttarantees. Since it is obviatts that the exclusion of such
matters from evidence is the most pra,ctical protection, we
adopt that means. It is no answer to say that the rule hampers
the task of the prosecuting officer. If forcecl to choose between
convenience to the prosectttor and a deprivation of constitutional gtwrantees to the citizens, we in fact have no choice.
Moreover, within constitutional limits, the Legislat1tre may
change the ntles defining the limits of legal police action.
It may well be that the Leg1:slattr1·e will desire to reconsider
Section 5173 and Section 5683 in the light of modern needs.
"\Ve, accordingly, are of the opinion that State v. Chtwhola,
S1tpra [2 W.W.Harr. 133 (120 A. 212)], and State v. Episcopo, supra [7 W.W.Harr. 439 (184 A. 872)], were erroneously decided and overrule them. The proper rule to be
applied in the criminal courts of this state is that evidence
obtained by a violation of constitutional guarantees is inadmissible at the trial of the person whose guarantees have been
41 C.2d-25
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violated, if timely objection is made thereto. We suggest the
adoption of an appropriate rule by the Court of General Sessions to cover the subject. Cf. Rule 41 (e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A.
"The conviction of the plaintiff in error is reversed." (Emphasis added.)
In view of the foregoing I would grant the writ here prayed
for and discharge the petitioner from custody.
Schauer, J., concurred in the reasoning and in the conclusion stated by Justice Carter.
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MABEL THORP, Appellant, v. THOMAS J. RANDAZZO,
as Executor, etc., Respondent.
[1] Insurance-Beneficiaries-Nature of Beneficiary's Interest.The position of beneficiary named in insurance policy subject
to change by insured is similar to that of beneficiary of will,
a mere expectancy dependent on designation at time of insured's death.
[2] Husband and Wife- Property Settlement Agreements- Interpretation.-Where property settlement agreement covers
all property of the parties, and wife, in accepting certain
provisions for her benefit, fully releases husband with respect
to all other property, such release ordinarily covers and includes her interest as designated beneficiary on insurance
policy; but where language is not broad enough to encompass
such an expectancy or an intent appears to exclude such rights
as present part of settlement, wife may still take as beneficiary if policy so provides.
[3] !d.-Property Settlement Agreements-Interpretation.-In interpreting property settlement agreements, courts weigh carefully language employed by the parties in measure of renunciation of their respective rights; general expressions or
clauses are not to be construed as including an assignment
or renunciation of expectancies, and a beneficiary therefore
[1 J See Cal.Jur., Insurance, § 120; Am.Jur., Insurance, § 1274
et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 45; Am.Jur., Husband
and Wife, § 318 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Insurance,§ 221; [2, 3, 5, 6] Husband
and Wife, § 157 ( 6) ; [ 4] Insurance, § 225.

